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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
         The litigation giving rise to this appeal began when a 
locally owned dairy in Northern New Jersey sued a large Canadian 
corporation, its affiliates, and several New Jersey dairies 
purchased by the corporation in the 1980s.  The plaintiff, Ideal 
Dairy Farms, Inc. ("Ideal"), filed a complaint that raised breach 
of contract, tort, fraud, RICO, and antitrust claims.  One of the 
defendants, Tuscan Dairy Farms ("Tuscan"), filed a counterclaim 
against Ideal seeking payment of unpaid invoices totalling over 
$2 million. 
         After extensive discovery proceedings, defendants moved 
for summary judgment on their counterclaim and on all of Ideal's 
twenty-five claims.  The district court granted summary judgment 
dismissing the claims against the defendants on the basis of its 
finding that Ideal failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact.  It also granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on 
their counterclaim and awarded Tuscan $2,264,333.71.  Ideal 
appealed the district court's summary judgment order.   
         With regard to Ideal's claims involving the 1985 supply 
contract between Tuscan and Ideal, we believe that Ideal has 
sufficiently demonstrated that genuine issues of material fact 
exist that preclude summary judgment.  As a result, we will 
reverse and remand the following claims: 
         (1)  Breach of Contract (Eleventh Count); 
 
         (2)  Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith (Twelfth 
              Count); and 
 
         (3)  Tortious Interference with Contract (Fourteenth 
              Count). 
With regard to all other remaining claims, we find that summary 
judgment was properly granted against Ideal.  We will therefore 
affirm the district court's order dismissing all of the antitrust 
claims, the common law fraud and RICO claims, and the tort claims 
not involving the 1985 supply contract.   
                                I. 
         The appellant, Ideal, is a New Jersey corporation owned 
by Mark Greenberg and Gil Levine.  Ideal distributes processed 
dairy products to retail customers and to customers in the food 
service industry.  In the mid-1980s, the Labatt corporation, a 
Canadian entity with major interests in the beer and dairy 
industries, began acquiring dairies in the United States.  For 
example, in Northern New Jersey, Labatt acquired Tuscan and 
Johanna Dairy Farms ("Johanna").  Labatt also purchased smaller 
dairy plants in Northern New Jersey, which it either consolidated 
with other more efficient plants or shut down. 
         In 1985, Ideal found itself in need of a new processed 
milk supplier and entered into negotiations with Tuscan.  Tuscan 
purchases raw dairy products from farmers and processes them for 
sale to retail and industrial customers, as well as to 
distributors like Ideal.  At that time, Tuscan was owned by Lou 
Caiola.  Mr. Caiola submitted a proposed supply contract to Ideal 
for its consideration.  Joint App. 316-23 ("1985 contract").  
Ideal had no part in the preparation of the contract and signed 
the contract without making any changes to the text.  The 
contract covered pricing and payment requirements but contained 
no clause providing for a term after which the contract would 
expire, nor did it discuss how the contract could be terminated.  
Mark Greenberg admitted at his deposition that, when they signed 
the contract, he and Mr. Levine were aware that the contract had 
"no length" and that they were "satisfied with no period of 
time."  Joint App. 527 & 529. 
         The 1985 contract provided that "[a]ll milk and milk 
product prices [would be] based upon [the February 1985] Federal 
Milk Marketing Order."  See Joint App. 317 (1985 contract, 
paragraph 2).  The Federal Milk Marketing Order sets the minimum 
"Class I" price that a processor must pay to a farmer.  The 
contract further provided that future prices could be adjusted 
whenever the Department of Agriculture changed Class I prices and 
also when "documentable or industrywide cost[s]" increased or 
decreased.  Id.  Such price adjustments were to be "consistent 
with generally accepted industry practice."  Id.  In addition to 
those adjustments, the contract also allowed Tuscan to add "an 
additional amount equal to 10% of [any] increase or decrease" 
after April 1, 1986.  Id. 
         Labatt purchased Tuscan Dairy in December 1986.  Lou 
Caiola continued to manage Tuscan's business, however, until 
October 1987.  At that time, Herbert England, a Labatt employee, 
was appointed to replace Mr. Caiola.  England was in charge at 
Tuscan until 1988, when he was replaced by Robert Facchina who 
ran the business for the remainder of Tuscan's relationship with 
Ideal. 
         Every day, Ideal ordered products from Tuscan.  Every 
night, Tuscan loaded the order onto Ideal's trucks so that Ideal 
could deliver its cargo to customers the following morning.  
Every week, Tuscan sent Ideal an invoice of its purchases.  Ideal 
responded by paying the invoices, meticulously subtracting for 
any product not received, or received but substandard.  Every 
month, for nearly seven years, Tuscan sent Ideal notice of any 
upcoming price changes.  Often these notices included a statement 
explaining the price changes and a newly revised price list of 
Tuscan's offerings. 
         Soon after it began doing business with Tuscan, Ideal 
realized that Tuscan was charging prices well above expected 
contract prices.  Beginning in 1987, Tuscan began steadily 
increasing prices, usually blaming the increases on various 
premiums charged by farmers, cooperatives, and state governments.  
For example, Tuscan increased Ideal's prices in 1987 claiming 
that RCMA, a dairy farmers' cooperative, had increased the 
premium that it charged in addition to the Class I price.  Later, 
when RCMA reduced its premium, Ideal never received the benefit 
of the cost decrease.  Ideal discovered this overcharging by 
reading certain industry bulletins that publish actual changes in 
premiums charged by various raw milk suppliers.  
         Ideal first complained to Lou Caiola in 1987 that these 
price increases violated the terms of the 1985 contract, and for 
the next five years, Ideal continued to complain about the 
overcharges to Mr. Caiola's successors.  At times, management at 
Tuscan promised that, if Ideal was patient, it would get the 
decrease that was due.  At other times, Tuscan's management 
refused to discuss the issue. 
         At a meeting held on March 2, 1990, Tuscan's management 
attempted to rationalize its prices by comparing them, on a 
blackboard, to price increases authorized under the 1985 
contract.  In the end, Tuscan was unable to show on the 
blackboard that it had been increasing prices in compliance with 
the contract's pricing formula.  Instead, the blackboard 
calculations highlighted the extent of Tuscan's overcharging.  
Mr. Facchina terminated the meeting and refused to discuss prices 
further. 
         Because Labatt owned all of the dairies capable of 
handling Ideal's supply needs, Mr. Greenberg and Mr. Levine 
believed that they were stuck with Tuscan.  They doubted that 
they could obtain a better price elsewhere.  Therefore, they 
concluded that they had no choice but to pay the overcharges.  In 
addition, a New Jersey regulation hampered Ideal's ability to 
shop freely for a milk supplier who might offer a lower price.  
Section 2:52-3.1 of the New Jersey Administrative Code requires 
that milk dealers give milk suppliers two weeks notice before 
changing their source of supply.  N.J. Admin. Code, tit. 2,  52- 
3.1 (1996).  This regulation combined with Labatt's control of 
several local dairies deterred Ideal from taking its business 
elsewhere, and Ideal's management begrudgingly continued to pay 
the price increases. 
         In late 1990, Tuscan began pressuring Ideal to enter a 
new contract with a five or six year term.  Tuscan informed Ideal 
that, under a new policy implemented at all Labatt-owned dairies, 
all customers would be required to enter new contracts.  Ideal 
successfully delayed signing a new agreement and secretly began 
looking for a new supply arrangement. 
         In May 1992, Ideal began to negotiate with Cumberland 
Farms dairy ("Cumberland").  Initially, Ideal sought only to 
acquire a certain size container, which Tuscan had discontinued.  
Cumberland, however, refused to supply just the one item but 
offered to supply Ideal with all of its product needs.  Once they 
entered negotiations, Ideal also began building its own depot in 
Newark, where it could refrigerate products after hauling them 
from Cumberland's South Jersey premises.   
         On June 12, 1992, Ideal opened its own depot and began 
receiving supplies from Cumberland.  It abruptly severed its 
relationship with Tuscan, leaving 15 invoices unpaid.  Also in 
June 1992, Ideal commenced this lawsuit against Labatt, its 
affiliates, and the Labatt-owned dairies, alleging violations of 
antitrust, contract, fraud, and tort law.  The district court 
granted the defendants motion for summary judgment and ordered 
Ideal to pay the unpaid invoices, thereby awarding Tuscan a total 
of $2,264,333.71.  Ideal appeals the district court's summary 
judgment orders. 
                               II. 
         The standard of review applied to the appeal of an 
order granting summary judgment is firmly established.  "An 
appellate court reviews the district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district 
court.  This requires that [the court] view the underlying facts 
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion."  Pennsylvania Coal 
Ass'n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation 
omitted; emphasis added); see also Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 
325, 329 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 64 (1995); Valhal 
Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). 
         Summary judgment should be granted only if a court 
concludes that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The moving party bears the burden 
of proving that no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute.  
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 586 n.10 (1986).  Once the movant has carried its initial 
burden, the nonmoving party "must come forward with 'specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"  Id. at 
587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e)) (emphasis added in 
Matsushita).  The non-movant must present concrete evidence 
supporting each essential element of its claim.  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 
         The question for this court, then, is whether Ideal 
presented sufficient evidence to create a dispute regarding a 
genuine issue of material fact, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Ideal.  Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 
56 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 1995); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., 
Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 
912 (1993); Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 
F.2d 1368, 1381 (3d Cir. 1991).  "Facts that could alter the 
outcome are 'material', and disputes are 'genuine' if evidence 
exists from which a rational person could conclude that the 
position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed 
issue is correct."  Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance 
Co., 57 F.3d 300, 302 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
         The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the plaintiff's complaint in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
1301, 15 U.S.C.  1 et seq., 28 U.S.C.  1367, and 18 U.S.C.  
1965.  It had pendent jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law 
claims.  This court has jurisdiction to review the district 
court's final order granting summary judgment under 28 U.S.C.  
1291. 
                               III. 
         The district court properly granted summary judgment 
dismissing Ideal's fraud and RICO claims, as well as its 
antitrust claims.  There is simply not enough concrete evidence 
in the record supporting these claims.  However, the district 
court improperly granted summary judgment dismissing Ideal's 
contract claims because genuine issues of material fact do exist. 
                                A. 
         In its second amended complaint, Ideal argued that 
Tuscan breached the 1985 supply contract by increasing prices in 
a manner not consistent with the pricing formula established by 
the contract.  The district court found that the following facts 
were undisputed: 
         (1) A contract was formed between the parties in 1985, 
         and it contained a price formula; (2) Beginning in 
         1987, the invoices Tuscan sent to Ideal did not follow 
         the price formula in the contract; (3) Ideal complained 
         about this failure to comply with [the] contract price 
         formula numerous times; (4) Tuscan told Ideal that the 
         invoice prices were the prices it was charging, and 
         that Ideal could take its business elsewhere if it 
         wanted; and (5) Ideal continued to order products from 
         Tuscan at the invoice prices, not contract prices, for 
         a period of five years. 
Slip Op. at 19.  The court found that there were three possible 
ways to construe these facts: 
         (1) the contract was intact from its formation until 
         June of 1992 and Tuscan continually breached the 
         contract from 1987 on; (2) the contract was intact from 
         its formation until June of 1992, but the price term 
         was modified by the invoices and Ideal's payment on 
         them; or (3) the original signed contract was 
         terminated in 1987, and from the point of termination 
         on the parties formed a new contract each time Ideal 
         ordered goods, Tuscan sent them an invoice, and Ideal 
         made a payment based on that invoice. 
Id. at 20.   
         "Summary judgment may not be granted . . . if there is 
a disagreement over what inferences can be reasonably drawn from 
the facts even if the facts are undisputed."  Nathanson, 926 F.2d 
at 1380 (citing Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985)).  In addition, "[a]ny 'unexplained 
gaps' in materials submitted by the moving party . . ., if 
pertinent to material issues of fact, justify denial of a motion 
for summary judgment."  Ingersoll-Rand Financial Corp. v. 
Anderson, 921 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting O'Donnell v. 
United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Finding 
three possible constructions of the facts suggests that there is 
a genuine issue of material fact about which a jury could 
reasonably disagree.  The court's finding of factual ambiguity 
should have ensured that the contract claim proceed to trial. 
         It is well-established that "the inferences to be drawn 
from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion."  Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 587-88 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 
654, 655 (1962)).  In this case, however, instead of allowing a 
jury to decide which interpretation of the facts was correct, the 
district court chose a favored interpretation.  Moreover, it 
chose an interpretation that favors the movant over the non- 
movant.   
         The district court immediately rejected the idea that 
the 1985 supply contract had been modified by the regular 
submission and payment of invoices.  It based its rejection on a 
provision of the contract that explicitly prohibits modification 
by a course of conduct without a signed writing.  Joint App. 321- 
322 (1985 Contract, para. 14).  Between the two remaining 
constructions, the district court held that the third option was 
"the correct one."  Id.   
         The court held that "as a matter of law, the 1985 
Contract was terminated by the departure in 1987 from the pricing 
terms set forth in that contract."  Slip Op. at 23 (emphasis 
added).  In support of its holding, the court pointed out that 
the agreement was an at-will contract because it provided for no 
term.  The court concluded that, by overcharging, Tuscan "did 
seemingly indicate [its] termination of the agreement by [its] 
actions."  Id.  Thus, the district court held that the at-will 
contract was terminated in 1987, and from 1987 until 1992, the 
parties re-contracted each time Tuscan offered a new invoice and 
Ideal accepted by payment.  Id.  The court held therefore that, 
even if Ideal had a claim for breach of contract by termination 
without reasonable notice, that claim was barred under the four- 
year statute of limitations for contract claims. 
         We find that the district court improperly resolved a 
genuine issue of material fact.  The district court's finding 
that the contract was terminated by implication in 1987 is not 
the only inference that could reasonably be drawn from the facts.  
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Ideal, Tuscan's 
management did not indicate that the contract was "meaningless" 
or "not valid" until late 1990.  At that time, Labatt implemented 
a policy that required Tuscan to enter new supply contracts with 
all buyers.  According to the record, Tuscan began to press Ideal 
to sign a new agreement in late 1990 or early 1991.  See Joint 
App. 576-88 & 1061.   
         Until late 1990, Tuscan's management did its best to 
justify the price increases in a manner that was consistent with 
the 1985 contract pricing provisions.  For instance, at the March 
2, 1990, meeting, Mr. Facchina attempted to show on a blackboard 
that its prices complied with the terms of the 1985 contract.  
This conduct is not consistent with the district court's finding 
that the contract was terminated prior to 1990.  Rather, by using 
the 1985 contract as a guide to proper pricing, Tuscan expressed 
its belief that the contract was operative at the time of the 
March 2, 1990, meeting. 
         By 1991, it is logical to conclude that Tuscan had 
indicated its unilateral termination of the 1985 contract.  Ideal 
filed this suit in June 1992.  Ideal may therefore have a valid 
contract claim that is not time-barred by the statute of 
limitations applied to contract claims.  Because a reasonable 
jury could find that the termination occurred in 1990 or 1991, 
rather than in 1987, summary judgment should not have been 
granted. 
         In sum, we find that the district court did not view 
the facts in a light most favorable to Ideal, the non-movant, 
when it concluded that the contract was unilaterally terminated 
by conduct in 1987.  The court's order granting summary judgment 
against Ideal on its breach of contract claim will therefore be 
reversed and remanded. 
                                B. 
         In a single sentence, the district court explained its 
dismissal of Ideal's claim alleging breach of the contract's 
implied covenant of good faith.  The court said, "It is obvious 
that defendants cannot have violated good faith by their 'denial 
of the existence of the Contract,' when the contract was 
terminated prior to their denial by the change in the prices 
charged by defendants."  Slip Op. at 27-28.  The court therefore 
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
         As discussed above, a reasonable jury could find that 
the supply contract was terminated, not by the prices charged in 
Tuscan's invoices, but by Tuscan's more explicit repudiation of 
the contract in late 1990.  If the contract was not terminated by 
its conduct prior to Tuscan's express denial, but rather was 
terminated by the express denial itself, Ideal may indeed have a 
claim for breach of the good faith covenant.  At any rate, there 
is a fundamental chronological dispute which presents a genuine 
issue of material fact relevant to Ideal's claim that Tuscan 
breached the contract's implied covenant of good faith. 
         This factual discrepancy was improperly resolved by the 
district court on summary judgment and should have been preserved 
for resolution by a jury.  Therefore, the court's dismissal of 
Ideal's claim that Tuscan breached the 1985 contract's covenant 
of good faith will also be reversed and remanded. 
                                C. 
         The same temporal dispute requires reversal of the 
district court's order granting summary judgment on Ideal's 
tortious interference with contract claim.  The district court 
held that "[b]ecause Ideal brought its tortious interference with 
contract claim more than two years after the contract was 
terminated without reasonable notice," its claim was barred by a 
two-year statute of limitations.  Slip Op. at 31. 
         The court's conclusion was based on its finding that 
the contract was terminated in 1987.  As we previously concluded, 
the facts may be reasonably interpreted to support a finding that 
the contract was not terminated until late 1990 or early 1991.  
If a jury found that the contract was not terminated until late 
1990, the statute of limitations may not bar Ideal's tortious 
interference claim.  Therefore, summary judgment was improperly 
granted, and the court's order will be reversed and remanded. 
                               IV. 
         The district court properly granted summary judgment 
dismissing the balance of Ideal's claims. 
                                A. 
         The district court did not err in dismissing Ideal's 
claim that Tuscan committed fraud by departing upward from the 
1985 contract's pricing scheme.  Under New Jersey law, a 
plaintiff claiming fraud must prove that it detrimentally relied 
on an intentionally misleading statement made by the defendant.  
See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cronin, 51 A.2d 2 
(N.J. Err. & App. 1947).  Ideal admitted however that, early in 
its relationship with Tuscan, it became aware that the invoice 
prices were higher than the prices envisioned in the contract.  
Ideal cannot now claim that it detrimentally relied on Tuscan's 
intentional misrepresentation because Ideal knew it was being 
overcharged for purchases almost from the start.  Therefore, the 
district court properly found that Ideal had no cause of action 
in fraud. 
                                B. 
         For very similar reasons, Ideal cannot make out a claim 
for violation of the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C.  1961 etseq., nor 
for violation of New Jersey's RICO Act.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 2C:41-1 et seq.  As the fraudulent predicate acts required 
by both state and federal RICO statutes, Ideal argued that Tuscan 
committed mail and wire fraud.  However, the district court found 
that there could be no finding of fraud in light of Ideal's 
admission that, early in the relationship, it knew that Tuscan 
was not complying with the contract.  Therefore, the district 
court held that Ideal could "not rely on fraud as a predicate act 
for purposes of Federal RICO," nor for purposes of New Jersey 
RICO.  Slip Op. at 18-19. 
         We agree that Ideal cannot make out a claim for mail or 
wire fraud.  Indeed, no fraudulent act occurred in this case.  
Without a predicate act, Ideal cannot possibly succeed on its 
federal and state RICO claims.  These claims were therefore  
properly dismissed. 
                                C. 
         The district court also dismissed Ideal's claim that 
Tuscan tortiously interfered with its prospective economic 
advantage.  In support of its claim, Ideal alleged that Tuscan 
undermined its relationships with customers by offering them 
extremely low prices and that Tuscan told Ideal to stay away from 
certain new retailers. 
         The district court found that Ideal failed to present 
evidence of each essential element of its interference claim.  
With regard to Ideal's allegation that Tuscan undermined its 
relationship with a customer, the court found that  
         Tuscan entered into an agreement with Ideal to return 
         the customer and to make supplemental payments to 
         Ideal.  This in effect eliminated any claim for 
         tortious interference, substituting a contractual 
         obligation. 
Joint App. 462 (Dist. Ct. Op. 29).  With regard to the 
allegations that Tuscan employees interfered by warning Ideal to 
stay away from certain prospective customers, the court found no 
evidence of injury because "Ideal . . . failed to put forward 
evidence that it was even interested in any of [those] accounts . 
. .."  Id. 
         To establish a claim of tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage, Ideal must present concrete 
evidence that Tuscan intentionally and maliciously interfered 
with a "protectable right," and that Tuscan's interference caused 
injury.  Printing Mart -- Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 
563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1987).  "A complaint must demonstrate that 
a plaintiff was in 'pursuit' of business."  Id.  First, Ideal has 
not shown that it was in serious pursuit of the new accounts 
targeted by Tuscan.  Second, the allegations made by Ideal fail 
to reach the necessary level of maliciousness.  Id. ("[M]alice is 
defined to mean that the harm was inflicted intentionally and 
without justification or excuse.").  Tuscan admitted that it was 
wrong to solicit Ideal's customer and voluntarily gave the 
account back to Ideal.  Third, Ideal has not shown that "'if 
there had been no interference[,] there was a reasonable 
probability that [it] would have received the anticipated 
economic benefits.'"  Id. (quoting Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 
384 A.2d 859 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 391 A.2d 523 (1978)).   
         Thus, we agree with the district court's conclusion 
that Ideal failed to establish a claim for tortious interference 
with prospective economic advantage.  Summary judgment dismissing 
this claim was properly granted. 
                                D. 
         We also agree with the district court's finding that 
Ideal failed to present sufficient evidence to support its 
antitrust claims.  At one time, the Supreme Court endorsed a 
slightly stricter standard of review when a summary judgment 
order was challenged in an antitrust case.  Poller v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Harold 
Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d 1068, 1080 (3d Cir. 1978).  
However, that "special standard" was abandoned in Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2083 (1992); 
see also Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 481 ("It may be that because 
antitrust cases are so factually intensive that summary judgment 
occurs proportionately less frequently there than in other types 
of litigation, but the standard of F.R.C.P. 56 remains the 
same.").  Therefore, the ordinary standard applies.  Eastman 
Kodak, 112 S.Ct. at 2083.  In order to survive a summary judgment 
challenge, a plaintiff must prove that a genuine issue of 
material fact could be presented at trial, such that a reasonable 
jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on that issue.  
                                1. 
         The district court did not err in dismissing Ideal's 
essential facilities claim.  To establish the necessary elements 
of this claim, Ideal was required to show: 
         (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
         (2) the competitor's inability practically or 
         reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) 
         denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 
         (4) the feasibility of providing the facility. 
Delaware Health Care, Inc. v. MCD Holding Co., 893 F. Supp. 1279 
(D.Del. 1995) (citing among others Monarch Entertainment Bureau, 
Inc. v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 715 F. Supp. 1290, 1300 
(D.N.J.) (citations omitted), aff'd 893 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir. 
1989)). 
         The district court properly applied this test and 
concluded: 
         Even if Ideal could demonstrate that defendants 
         monopolized the market, that it was unable to duplicate 
         an essential facility, and that it was feasible for 
         defendants to make the essential facility available to 
         Ideal, Ideal cannot contradict one important fact:  
         defendants did not deny Ideal use of its facility, the 
         third factor. 
Slip Op. at 32.  The district court is correct.  Almost five 
years after realizing that Tuscan was overcharging it, Ideal's 
business was still located on the premises of Tuscan Dairy Farms.  
The facts in the record show that Ideal was not denied use of 
Tuscan's facilities. 
         Thus, the district court's ruling in favor of 
defendants' motion for summary judgment was proper.  Because the 
New Jersey Antitrust Act provides that it should be construed in 
a manner consistent with federal antitrust law, Ideal's parallel 
New Jersey claim was also properly dismissed.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 56:9-18. 
                                2. 
         Ideal claims that the defendants conspired with 
Elmhurst Dairy to monopolize milk production in New Jersey, in 
violation of  1 of the Sherman Act.  15 U.S.C.  1.  The court 
dismissed this claim, finding that Ideal failed to submit anyevidence 
supporting its assertion that defendants conspired with 
Elmhurst.  Slip Op. at 36.  It also found that Ideal failed to 
present any evidence proving the four essential elements of a  1 
claim set forth in J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion Inc., 909 
F.2d 1524, 1541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 
(1991).   
         A plaintiff alleging a  1 violation has a heavy burden 
when opposing a summary judgment motion on that claim.  In Tunis 
Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1221 (1992), this court explained:  
"[W]hen an antitrust defendant's conduct is consistent with both 
permissible competition and illegal conspiracy, a plaintiff 'must 
present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the 
alleged conspirators acted independently' in order to survive a 
motion for summary judgment."  Id. at 720 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 
588 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 
465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984))) (emphasis added).   
         Ideal has not excluded the possibility that the 
agreement between Elmhurst and Tuscan was completely legal.  
Although Ideal claimed that the conspiracy was finalized by a 
written agreement between Tuscan and Elmhurst, no such document 
was presented to the court.  In fact, the record was so vague 
that the district court could not determine how the alleged 
agreement might restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act.  
Slip Op. at 36.   
         The district court was correct to conclude that if the 
evidentiary record were reduced to admissible evidence, the 
plaintiff could not carry its burden of proof at trial.  Clark v. 
Modern Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that 
when opposing summary judgment motion, "plaintiff . . . must 
point to admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all 
elements of a prima facie case under applicable substantive 
law").  Summary judgment was therefore properly granted on 
Ideal's 1 Sherman Act claim and on its parallel state law claim. 
                                3. 
         To survive a summary judgment motion on its Sherman Act 
 2 monopolization claim, Ideal had to show that (1) Labatt 
possessed monopoly power in the relevant market, and that (2) 
Labatt willfully acquired and maintained monopoly power and did 
not acquire its monopoly share due to "growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historical 
accident."  Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 752 
F.2d 802, 808 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986).  
         The district court held that Ideal had not presented 
sufficient evidence of these essential elements, and it therefore 
granted the defendants' summary judgment motion.  The court gave 
two reasons in support of its ruling.  First, it held that Ideal 
failed to establish that the relevant geographic market was 
Northern New Jersey.  Slip Op. at 41; see also id. at 46.  And 
second, it concluded that a showing that Labatt held a market 
share of 47% in New Jersey did not prove the existence of a 
monopoly in Northern New Jersey.  Id. at 42. 
         Until the late 1980s, milk dealers faced significant 
regulatory barriers inhibiting free competition between New York 
City and New Jersey.  New York enforced regulations which, for 
practical purposes, excluded New Jersey dealers from the City.  
N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law  258-c.  And New Jersey enforced similar 
regulations protecting its dealers from New York competitors.  
N.J. Admin. Code, tit. 2,  52-6.1 & -6.2.  By the 1990s, 
however, both of these regulatory schemes had been challenged in 
federal courts and repealed.  Thus, when Ideal filed its 
monopolization claim, these barriers no longer limited its 
potential market to New Jersey. 
         We agree that Ideal's relevant market and market share 
calculations are dubious.  Ideal bore the burden of establishing 
the relevant market for purposes of proving its actual monopoly 
claim.  Tunis Bros., 952 F.2d at 726.  Ideal argued that the 
relevant market was Northern New Jersey or, in the alternative, 
the state of New Jersey.  Like the district court, we are not 
convinced that either is the relevant market for milk.  Ideal has 
failed to clearly establish the relevant product and geographic 
market necessary to make this claim. 
         Nor has Ideal persuaded this court that Labatt controls 
a monopoly share of either proposed relevant market.  Ideal 
estimated that Labatt held 47% of the New Jersey market and then 
extrapolated from that figure an estimate that Labatt controlled 
a larger share of the market in Northern New Jersey.  It is 
equally possible that Labatt might hold a smaller share of the 
market in Northern New Jersey.  Ideal offered nothing further to 
support its speculations.  Even if Ideal had shown that Labatt 
controlled 47% of the New Jersey market, without concrete 
evidence of anticompetitive behavior, this percentage does not 
prove Labatt to be a monopolist in New Jersey, nor in Northern 
New Jersey.  Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 
171, 201 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1285 (1993) ("As 
a matter of law, absent other relevant factors, a 55 percent 
market share will not prove the existence of monopoly power.").  
We therefore agree with the district court's conclusion that 
"Ideal fail[ed] to prove that defendants possessed monopoly power 
in any market."  Slip Op. at 42.  The district court properly 
granted summary judgment. 
                                4. 
         To prove the essential elements of its attempted 
monopolization claim, Ideal was required to present concrete 
evidence that (1) Labatt had engaged in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct with (2) specific intent to monopolize 
and with (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.  
See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillin, 113 S.Ct. 884, 890-91 
(1993).  It is clear that, when considering the "dangerous 
probability" prong of an attempted monopolization claim, a court 
must "inquir[e] into the relevant product and geographic market 
and the defendant's economic power in that market."  Id. at 892. 
         Whether a party violates  2 of the Sherman Act by 
"attempt[ing] to monopolize" is "a question of proximity and 
degree."  Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 402 
(1905).  Further, "the conduct of a single firm, governed by  2, 
'is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization.'"  
Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)).  As the Supreme 
Court explained: 
         The purpose of the Act is not to protect businesses 
         from the working of the market; it is to protect the 
         public from the failure of the market.  The law directs 
         itself not against conduct which is competitive, even 
         severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends 
         to destroy competition itself. 
Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 458. 
         Even assuming that the relevant market was Northern New 
Jersey, we do not believe that Ideal presented sufficient 
evidence that Labatt posed a dangerous threat of destroying 
competition in the milk industry.  We conclude that a higher 
degree and proximity to actual monopolization must be 
demonstrated before an award of treble damages can be seriously 
pursued.  Without proving a dangerous probability threatening 
destruction of competition in a clearly defined relevant market, 
the plaintiff may not proceed beyond summary judgment.  
Therefore, we find that the district court properly granted 
summary judgment dismissing Ideal's attempted monopolization 
claim. 
                                5. 
         To prove the essential elements of a claim brought 
under  7 of the Clayton Act, Ideal must prove that it has 
suffered "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent."  Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
477, 489 (1977).  Ideal claims only that competition in the 
industry has been reduced by Labatt's acquisitions.  However, it 
has not proved that it has been injured by the reduction in 
competition.  Moreover, there is no evidence in the record 
demonstrating any harm incurred by Ideal.  As the district court 
held, such conclusory assertions alone will not support a Clayton 
Act claim.  The district court properly granted summary judgment 
on that claim and on Ideal's parallel state law claim. 
                                V. 
         Finally, Ideal's civil conspiracy claim was also 
properly dismissed.  As discussed above, Ideal failed to present 
sufficient evidence of any conspiracy that allegedly occurred 
between the Labatt-owned dairies and Elmhurst Dairy.  Ideal 
additionally claims, however, that the Labatt-owned dairies 
conspired among themselves to obtain a monopoly in the industry.  
It is well-established that subsidiaries cannot illegally 
conspire with a corporate parent under 1 of the Sherman Act.  
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 
(1984) (holding that a corporate parent and its wholly owned 
subsidiary "are incapable of conspiring with each other").  
Therefore, the district court properly held that the civil 
conspiracy claim should also be summarily dismissed. 
 
 
                               VI. 
         We will reverse and remand the district court's order 
granting summary judgment on the following three claims brought 
against the defendants by Ideal:  (1) the breach of contract 
claim; (2) the breach of the contract's covenant of good faith 
claim; and (3) the tortious interference with contract claim.  We 
will affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment 
in favor of defendants on all of the remaining claims. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
         I respectfully dissent from part III of the majority 
opinion because I believe the district court correctly entered 
summary judgment on Ideal's contract, implied covenant of good 
faith, and tortious interference with contract claims. 
                                I. 
         The Ideal-Tuscan relationship spanned seven years from 
1985 to 1992.  Its terms were memorialized in a written contract 
(the "1985 Contract") that did not specify a term of duration and 
did not provide for notice of termination or any other 
termination procedure.  From almost the beginning of the 
relationship, Tuscan did not comply with the pricing provisions 
of the 1985 Contract.  From 1987 onwards, Ideal repeatedly 
complained to Tuscan about price increases and asserted that 
Tuscan's prices were not in accordance with the 1985 Contract.  
But Tuscan's management consistently refused to adjust invoice 
prices in response to Ideal's complaints, and Tuscan told Ideal 
it could take its business elsewhere if it wanted.  Nevertheless, 
Ideal continued to order products from Tuscan at invoice prices 
for five more years. 
         On the basis of these undisputed facts, the district 
court granted summary judgment to the defendants.  Opinion, Ideal 
Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt Ltd. et al., No. 92-2469 (D. 
N.J. May 11, 1995).  It held that the 1985 Contract was an at- 
will contract governed by the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code, 
and, because the contract was at-will, "[it] was terminated [as a 
matter of law] by the departure in 1987 from the pricing terms 
set forth [therein]"  Id. at 23.  The majority disagrees with the 
district court's legal analysis.  It concludes that factual 
issues remain as to when Tuscan terminated the 1985 Contract, and 
believes that Tuscan may have breached the 1985 Contract 
continuously over a three to five year period. 
                               II. 
         The 1985 Contract specified no term.  Under the New 
Jersey Uniform Commercial Code, a contract of indefinite duration 
"is valid for a reasonable time," but "may be terminated at any 
time by either party."  N.J. Stat. Ann.  12A:2-309(2). 
"Termination of a contract by one party . . .  requires that 
reasonable notification be received by the other party."  N.J. 
Stat. Ann.  12A:2-309(3). 
         The majority concludes that Tuscan may not have 
terminated the 1985 Contract until late 1990, when members of 
Tuscan management informed Ideal that the contract was 
"meaningless" and "not valid."  See Majority Opinion at 14.  
Under this interpretation, it would appear that an at-will 
contract cannot be terminated under  12A:2-309(3) unless 
notification is express.  I disagree.  A party's conduct may also 
terminate an at-will contract.  See Lumber Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Hansen, 846 P.2d 1046, 1049-50 (Mont. 1993) ("when [the seller] 
unilaterally raised its prices, it . . . put an end to the 
previous contract between the parties"); Michael Halebian N.J., 
Inc. v. Roppe Rubber Corp., 718 F. Supp. 348, 365 (D.N.J. 1989) 
(under U.C.C.  2-309, refusal to continue to supply goods in 
accordance with the terms of an at-will contract terminates the 
contract, not breaches it).  Termination through conduct may not 
provide the reasonable notice required by  12A:2-309(3), but 
failure to give reasonable notice does not mean the contract 
continues ad infinitum.  Rather the aggrieved party is entitled 
to damages arising from the failure to give reasonable notice.  
See Ronald A. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code  2-309:27 at 555 
(1982) ("When a contract is terminable at any time on notice and 
it is terminated without notice, the damages which the aggrieved 
party may recover are limited to those sustained during the 
notice period."). 
         In this case, Tuscan's pricing diverged from the 
contractual provision in 1987 at the latest.  Ideal knew it was 
being charged a greater amount than that called for by the 
contract and repeatedly complained.  In response, Tuscan clearly 
demonstrated--both by refusing to change its pricing and through 
specific statements--that it would not comply with the 1985 
Contract.  Therefore the contract was terminated at that time.  
While Tuscan failed to provide Ideal with reasonable notification 
of termination, its consistent refusal to abide by the terms of 
the contract terminated the contract.  Cf. Agway v. Ernst, 394 
A.2d 774 (Maine 1978) (where buyer was unaware of changes in 
price made by seller, at-will contract was breached and not 
terminated).  Ideal could have recovered damages for Tuscan's 
failure to provide reasonable notification, but it filed suit 
after the statute of limitations had run.  I would affirm the 
district court's entry of summary judgment on Ideal's claim for 
breach of contract. 
                               III. 
         Because Ideal's implied covenant of good faith and 
tortious interference with contract claims derive from its 
contract claim, I would grant summary judgment on those claims as 
well. 
                               IV. 
         For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
